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SURVEY SECTION
Agency Law. Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp.
v. Ryan, 697 A.2d 1087 (R.I. 1997). Where a defendant partici-
pated in a scheme designed to forward funds to an ineligible bor-
rower, the defendant will be held personally liable for the note
when bank records contained no written agreement memorializing
the alleged agency relationship between the defendant and a third
party.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 5, 1988, P. Alan Ryan (Ryan) signed a promissory
note in favor of Davisville Credit Union (Davisville). 1 The note
was in the amount of $1.6 million dollars. Davisville subsequently
failed because of unsound lending practices, and the Rhode Island
Depositors Economic Protection Corporation (DEPCO) became the
beneficiary to Davisville's rights under the note.2 On May 23,
1994, DEPCO sought to collect on the note and filed a complaint in
Rhode Island Superior Court. DEPCO alleged that the defendant
defaulted on the note and that Ryan was obligated under the note's
terms to pay the principal and interest plus costs.3
BACKGROUND
Ryan, the defendant, claimed that because he was an agent of
the principal actor, David LaRoche (LaRoche), he was not obli-
gated to the terms of the note.4 Ryan conceded that "the note itself
did not reveal any agency status, but he maintained that DEPCO
was chargeable with notice of the agency relationship on the basis
of other documents in Davisville's loan file."5 Ryan contended that
the documents created a genuine issue of material fact about
whether he had signed the note as an agent. Ryan claimed this
precluded the disposition of the case by summary judgment at the
trial level.6
1. See Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Ryan, 697 A.2d
1087, 1089 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
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Ryan admitted that he had participated in a plan to enable
LaRoche to evade adhering to the maximum borrowing limit estab-
lished by Davisville for individual debtors. 7 According to Ryan, the
transaction was designed to allow "Davisville to loan money to
Ryan for LaRoche's benefit."" In addition, Ryan claimed that
Davisville was aware of the agency relationship that existed be-
tween Ryan and LaRocheY In support of his allegations that the
debtor on the note was in fact LaRoche, Ryan identified lending-
procedure irregularities in several documents in the loan file that
he claimed revealed the true nature of the loan. 10 At the trial
level, the judge ruled that Ryan would survive summary judgment
because he alleged sufficient facts to establish a basis for his de-
fense. 1 ' However, the trial judge further determined that "none of
the facts presented by the defendant, separately or cumulatively,
is enough to put a subsequent holder of the note on notice of any
agency relationship."12 Ryan, however, had two defenses available
against DEPCO. These defenses were based on (1) the federal
holder-in-due-course doctrine13 and (2) the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine. 14
7. See id. at 1090.
8. Id.
9. Ryan contended that Davisville officials told him that he "was not respon-
sible for the loan and... would never be responsible for the loan since [he] was not
the borrower." Id.
10. Ryan alleged that at the time he signed the note, his annual income was
$36,000, he had never completed a loan application, he had never provided Davis-
vile with any financial information and he had never signed a purchase-and-sale
agreement for the property that was mortgaged as part of the transaction. See id.
The property in question consisted of forty-three waterfront lots in Portsmouth,
Rhode Island, which Ryan owned for fifteen minutes-just long enough to sign the
note and mortgage before deeding the property by quitclaim deed back to LaRoche.
Ryan also contended that the address on the note was the address of LaRoche. See
id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 1091. The court treated DEPCO and FDIC similarly as they
both essentially perform the same function. Cf O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79 (1994) (leaving it up to individual states to supplement a federal statutory
regulation that is comprehensive and detailed). But see Resolution Trust Corp. v.
A.W. Assoc., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Kan. 1994).
14. See Ryan, 697 A.2d at 1091 (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447 (1942)).
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Federal Holder-in-Due Course Doctrine
Traditionally a state law concept, the federal holder-in-due
course doctrine' 5 allows an entity such as DEPCO to hold a note in
the regular course of business. DEPCO would not ordinarily be
relegated to determining its status as a creditor under the Uniform
Commercial Code Rhode Island General Laws title 6A.16 However,
in order to facilitate its function as a federal-depository agency,1 7
DEPCO is afforded the protection of UCC regulation.' 8 The fed-
eral holder-in-due-course doctrine extends to the regulatory agency
the protection from personal defenses normally enjoyed by a
holder-in-due-course under state law, but does not extend to the
agency protection from real defenses.' 9 Ryan asserted only per-
sonal defenses. 20
Although Ryan argued that DEPCO knew or should have
known of his agency relationship with LaRoche, the documentation
in his loan file alone was insufficient to persuade the court to cre-
15. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982).
16. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6AI-101 to -9-507 (1956) (1992 Reenactment) (adopting
the Uniform Commercial Code).
17. The function of an agency such as the FDIC, or DEPCO in the present
case, is to pay the depositors of the failed institution. This is accomplished
through a purchase and assumption transaction whereby:
the receiver of the failed bank transfers the assets and liabilities of the
failed bank to another, solvent bank. In order to shield the acquiring
bank from loss that may result from the acquisition of high-risk assets
such as defaulted loans, the acquiring bank is permitted to return assets
that are not of the highest quality. The FDIC as corporate insurer then
purchases the returned assets from the receiver, who in turn forwards the
money to the acquiring bank. In essence, the FDIC makes good on risky
assets of the failed bank, thus allowing the assets and money transferred
to the acquiring bank to equal or exceed the assumed liabilities. The
FDIC then attempts to collect on the assets returned by the acquiring
bank in order to minimize loss to the insurance fund.
Ryan, 697 A.2d at 1091-92.
18. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6A-3-302 to -305 (1956) (1992 Reenactment) (setting
forth qualifications and rights of a holder-in-due-course in Rhode Island).
19. See Ryan, 697 A.2d at 1092. Personal defenses consist of, but are not lim-
ited to: (1) failure of consideration, (2) nondelivery and (3) fraud in the induce-
ment. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes § 654 (1963). Real defenses consist of: (1)
infancy, (2) incapacity, duress or illegality of the transaction that renders the
party's obligation a nullity, (3) fraud in the factum and (4) discharge in bank-
ruptcy. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-305(2) (1956).
20. The defendant sought to avoid liability on the note, which he admitted
signing, on the basis of an unrecorded agency agreement. See Ryan, 697 A.2d at
1093.
390 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
ate an agency relationship among the parties. 21 The defendant's
position was essentially that, because his "straw-man" status in
relation to LaRoche was arguably discernable on close inspection of
the bank records, a factual question was created concerning
whether DEPCO had notice of the alleged agency relationship. 22
The court found it reasonable that DEPCO would rely on the loan
documents as they existed in Davisville's file obligating Ryan to
assume responsibility for the note.23
The D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine
Second, the defendant argued that his agency relationship
with LaRoche was memorialized in writing within the meaning of
section 42-116-23 of the Rhode Island General Laws.24 The
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is similar to the federal holder-in-due-
course doctrine in that the FDIC2 5 is presumably on notice of writ-
ten agreements contained in the official records of a failed bank.
The two doctrines diverge, however, in two separate situations. 26
First, section 42-116-23 does not require actual notice on the part
21. The court noted that DEPCO could not be charged with knowledge of a
defense merely because that information was contained in the files. See id. at 1094
(citing FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 162 (6th Cir. 1985)).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Certain Agreements. No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the
interest of the corporation in any asset acquired by it under this chapter shall be
valid against the corporation unless such agreement:
(a) Is in writing;
(b) Was executed by the eligible institution and any person claiming an
adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously
with the acquisition of the asset by the eligible institution;
(c) Was approved by the board of directors of the eligible institution or its
loan committee; which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of the
board or committee; and
(d) Has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official rec-
ord of the eligible institution.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-23 (1956) (1993 Reenactment). This statute contains sub-
stantially the same language as that found in Rhode Island General Laws § 19-12-
13 (1956) (1995 Reenactment) (Rhode Island's receivership statute). Both statutes
essentially replicate 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Act, which codifies the federal common-law doctrine that originated in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
25. In this case, DEPCO is substituted for FDIC.
26. See Ryan, 697 A.2d at 1094-95.
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of DEPCO.27 If the agreement in contention satisfies the statute's
four prongs, then DEPCO's lack of knowledge will not defeat a
claim based on the agreement. 28 The defendant argued that his
agency relationship was reflected in various documents executed
at the closing and these documents, taken together, constituted a
written agreement within the meaning of section 42-116-23.29
Furthermore, the defendant contended that the trial judge erred in
requiring a "specific written document evidencing the agreement"
because the statute does not require a specific written document.30
The court, however, relied on Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.,31 which required adherence to the specific writing require-
ment in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).32 The court went on to equate the
receivership statute,33 which requires a specific writing,34 to the
DEPCO statute35 because the two statutes are ostensibly a carbon
copy of one another.36 The court and the statute, therefore, re-
quired the defendant to point to a specific writing in order to evi-
dence the relationship which he so fervently relied on, and Ryan
was unable to do soY
CONCLUSION
In dismissing both of Ryan's defenses, the court strictly ad-
hered to the statutory requirements set forth by the federal holder-
in-due-course doctrine and the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. Para-
27. See id. at 1095.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
32. See id. (citing the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e), which essentially provides that no agreement tending to diminish or de-
feat the FDIC's "right title or interest" in any asset acquired by the FDIC under
the section shall be valid against the FDIC unless it shall have been (1) in writing,
(2) executed contemporaneously with the bank's acquisition of the asset, (3) ap-
proved by the bank's board of directors or loan committee and reflected in the min-
utes of the board or committee and (4) continuously, from the time of its execution,
an official record of the bank).
33. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-12-13 (1956) (1989 Reenactment).
34. See Paradis v. Greater Providence Deposit Corp., 677 A.2d 1340 (R.I.
1996).
35. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-23 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
36. See Ryan, 697 A.2d at 1095.
37. Ryan admitted that, had such a writing been placed in the file, it would
have frustrated the purpose of the transaction which was to "pull the wool over
everyone's eyes." Id.
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mount to the defendant's agency claim was the relationship that
existed between himself, LaRoche and Davisville. In order to es-
tablish the necessary underpinnings of this unorthodox deal, Ryan
portrayed himself as an innocent pawn in a high-stakes game of
undercapitalized finance. 3S In attempting to create this portrait,
Ryan himself became so intertwined in the incestuous fact pattern
that his alleged naivete became highly suspect. Missing from the
purported agreement, however, was written evidence of this rela-
tionship. The inability to point to a specific written document, as
well as the protection DEPCO held under the federal holder-in-due
course doctrine, was decisive in the court's conclusion that Ryan
was liable on the note.
William J. Powers, IV
38. See id. at 1090.
